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lem is likely to develop as to how it can be given operative effect
in the other jurisdiction particularly since ancillary proceedings
can hardly be based thereon. That problem was resolved, in In re
Barrie's Estate,69 by granting permission to the legatees to withdraw the original rejected instrument for the purpose of offering
it for probate in a foreign state. The authority for such an order
was said to rest upon the absence of any contradictory provision
in the Probate Act70 and the inherent power of every court to
permit the removal of original files and exhibits. 7 1
Two sections of the Probate Act were amended during the
year. Section 38 now adds real estate sales in proceedings by a
guardian or conservator under the act to the types of sales in
which the owner may bring an action to acquire an outstanding
inchoate dower interest.7 2 Section 322 was also changed so that
the conservator or guardian is no longer automatically entitled to
administer the estate of his deceased ward but must secure new
letters of administration. 73

VII. PUBLIC LAW
ADMIINISTRATIVE LAW

The decision of the Supreme Court in Deutsch v. Department
of Insurance' furnishes an interesting commentary on the treatment to be accorded in a court of review upon informal administrative procedure. The applicants there concerned made due and
proper application for a license to engage in the small loan business.
The application was accompanied with an investigation fee, an annual license fee and a statutory bond, all in conformity with the
statute. 2 The Department was then required to make an investi69

331 Ill. App. 443, 73 N. E. (2d) 654 (1947).
7o Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 3, § 235, requires that all wills admitted to probate
shall remain in the custody of the clerk of the court, but is silent as to the disposition to be made of a rejected will.
71 Lee v. Hicks, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 169 (1841).
72 Laws 1947, p. 1, S. B. 225; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 3, § 189.
78 Laws 1947, p. 1, S. B. 213; I1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 3, § 476.
-1397 I1. 218, 73 N. E. (2d) 304 (1947).
2 I1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 74, § 19 et seq.
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gation and, if it appeared that the applicants were proper persons,
that public convenience and necessity would be served, and that
the applicants had sufficient assets, a license should then be issued.
If not, the Department was to retain the investigation fee but
was to return the other deposits and give notice of its decision.
No application was to be denied, however, until opportunity for
3
hearing had been provided and a proper record thereof kept,
upon which adverse determination review might be had in the
circuit court upon the record so made together with the transcript
of testimony and the exhibits, if any. 4 The procedure before the
Department did not achieve the formality contemplated by the
statute but consisted of the return of the deposits made and a
letter from the Supervisor of Small Loans advising that, on the
basis "of the economic need" in the community, the convenience
and advantage of the neighborhood would not be served.5
The applicants appealed to the circuit court and filed with the
clerk thereof the correspondence received from the Department.
The respondent appeared specially to quash the appeal, refused
to plead after denial of its motion, and the matter was set for
hearing. At that hearing, the applicants proved there was no
licensee operating at the place in question or within a radius of
nine miles thereof and otherwise showed themselves to be qualified, whereupon a decree was entered directing that a license be
issued to them. The Department appealed from that order contending first that the action of the supervisor was not the action
of the Department but this argument was rejected upon a theory
somewhat analogous to that of apparent authority.6 It then relied
on the claim that no jurisdiction had been acquired because no
transcript of the record had been filed, but again the court found
that the Department was seeking to take advantage of its own
default hence it could see no insuperable difficulty in accepting
3 Ibid., § 22.
4 Ibid., § 43.

5 A second letter followed, but it was of no significance exept that it was subsequently filed as part of the record.
6 The court said, in that respect: "The situation presented here is the acme of
administrative absolutism. It is with poor grace that appellant says the Supervisor
of Small Loans Division was not acting for and in behalf of the Department of
Insurance." See 397 I. 218 at 229, 73 N. E. (2d) 304 at 310.
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the originals of the correspondence, etc., in lieu of copies. The
court did indicate, however, that while the lack of a transcript
did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction it was necessary to
reverse for the court should not have heard the case de novo but
should have remanded with directions to the Department to prepare a proper transcript "with sufficient particularity to enable
an intelligent judicial review. "7
The court does not appear to pass definitively upon the scope
of review permitted by the statute, which is regrettable, since that
would seem to be a most significant aspect of the case. Section 25
of the Act" obviously contains language fraught with great difficulty insofar as the scope of review in Illinois is concerned. The
review is referred to specifically as an "appeal" and the court
consistently so refers to it. It is doubtful if the constitution would
permit the delegation to the judicial department of jurisdiction
over a true appeal from a proceeding intended to culminate in the
issuance, or refusal to issue, of a license. It is difficult to believe
that such function is judicial or even quasi-judicial. 9 If the statute contemplates a review of little broader scope than a commonlaw certiorari, then there would be question of its validity. 10 It
would seem, however, that although the statute provides specifically that the review shall be "for the purpose of having the
reasonableness or lawfulness of the order, decision or finding
inquired into and determined," all clearly within the scope of
certiorari, the court possesses a somewhat broader conception of
the scope of review. It refers specifically to the language of
Section 25 providing for the trial, of the appeal "without formal
pleading, but otherwise according to the rules relating to the trial
of chancery suits, so far as applicable", and concludes as follows:
The legislative intent reflected by the provision is that the
court, upon appeal from orders relative to the administration
or enforcement of the Small Loans Act, shall do more than
merely review orders of the Department of Insurance. Upon
7397 Ill. 218 at 229, 73 N. E. (2d) 304 at 311.

s Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 74, § 43.
9City of Aurora v. Schoeberlein, 230 Ill. 496, 82 N. E. 860 (1907).
10 Bartunek v. Lastovken, 350 Ill. 380, 183 N. E. 333 (1932).
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appeal, the circuit court is vested with authority to determine
whether a license should be granted or denied, its determination being based upon the record of the proceedings before
the Department, together with evidence heard upon the
appeal."
It would thus seem that the review, believed by the court to be
contemplated by the Act, lies somewhere between a true appeal
and a certiorari proceeding. It is to be expected, therefore, that
the court will have ample opportunity to pass specifically upon
the constitutionality of this type of review in subsequent proceedings, whether under this or similar statutes or under the provi12
sions of the Administrative Review Act.
The case of People ex rel. Siegel v. Rogers1 3 presents an
interesting twist upon the well-recognized doctrine that an individual must be a de jure officer in order to use mandamus proceedings to compel his reinstatement in office.' 4 The case required an
interpretation of certain provisions of the Fire and Police Commissioner's Act 15 forbidding, in substance, the removal except
pursuant to the provisions of the act, of an employee of a fire or
police department who had held his position for more than a year
preceding the effective date of the act. Apparently, petitioner
had been appointed by the president of the village but the appointment had not been confirmed by the board of trustees. His position was that the provisions of the act referred to were intended,
by the legislature, to constitute public servants falling within its
provisions de jure officers. In rejecting this contention, the Appellate Court relied upon the Moon 16 and Armspach 17 cases, and
distinguished the Reed case,"' relied upon by the relator, upon
11 397

Ill. 218 at 231, 73 N. E. (2d) 304 at 311.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 264 et seq.
1 329 Ill. App. 430, 69 N. E. (2d) 108 (1946), reversed in 397 Ill. 187, 73 N. E.
(2d) 316 (1947). •
14 People v. Board of Review of Cook County, 351 Il1. 301, 184 N. E. 325 (1933)
McNeill v. City of Chicago, 212 I1. 481, 72 N. E. 450 (1904).
15 il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 24, § 14-11.
16 Moon v. Mayor of City of Champaign, 214 I1. 40, 73 N. E. 408 (1905).
'7 People ex rel. Mitchell v. Armspach, 314 Il1. App. 573, 41 N. E. (2d) 781 (1942),
abst. opin.
18 Reed v. City of Peoria, 318 Ill. App. 271, 47 N. E. (2d) 863 (1943).
12
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the ground that in that decision the petitioner had been found to
be, in fact, a de jure officer. The Supreme Court, however, granted
leave to appeal and reversed that holding on the ground that to
decide otherwise would render nugatory the curative operation
of the provision in question, a provision enacted with a purpose
to cure the evils noted in the earlier cases.
A somewhat more liberal attitude toward the writ of mandamus is found in People ex rel. Caslin v. Geary'9 wherein the
court was confronted with the delicate problem of control of
administrative discretion by means of such a writ. The petitioner
there sought to compel his certification and appointment to the
civil service position of deputy inspector in the department of
weights and measures. Defendants unsuccessfully resisted the
granting of the writ upon the contentions (a) that plaintiff had
failed to show a clear legal right thereto, and (b) that issuance
of the writ would create confusion, public inconvenience and embarrassment in the conduct of public business. In view of the
frequency with which the courts succumb to these general arguments without any real examination of the facts and thus, in effect,
sanction flagrant evasion of civil service laws, the skillful and
courageous manner in which the court analyzed the facts in that
case should not go unnoticed.
The essential facts were not in dispute. A civil service
examination was held for the position in question and in due time
the eligible list created thereby was posted. It contained twenty.
six names and petitioner was listed in the twentieth place thereon.
Thereafter, and up to the time of trial, fourteen certifications and
appointments were made, thirteen being persons ahead of the
petitioner. 20 Of the remaining six, three had waived certification
because of military service, one filed a waiver because he was
"frozen " in a position in a defense plant, and one was on extended
leave of absence. The last of these individuals, nineteenth on the
eligible list, had not been certified but he was then in military
19 330 Il. App. 172, 71 N. E. (2d) 96 (1947).
20 The fourteenth appointee was No. 23 on the list, but the court commented on
the fact that the record did not disclose why he was appointed instead of the
petitioner.
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service although prior thereto he had worked as a temporary
employee in the department. The evidence further disclosed that
five temporary employees occupied positions, they being chiefly
women and spouses of regular appointees away on military
service.
In addition to the general grounds above mentioned, the
defendants also contended that the use of temporary employees
was justified because of the greater suitability of women for
certain types of shopping and that it was proper to use temporary help to hold jobs for those in military service. While conceding the validity of a distinction based upon sex and the pro21
priety of creating separate eligibility lists for men and women,
the court rejected the first of these contentions by indicating that
separate lists had not been created; that no specification of sex
was made in the requisition from the department head; that men
and women deputies were employed interchangeably without regard to sex; and that Section 10 of the Civil Service Act specifically provides that in making certification sex shall be disregarded
"except when some statute, the rules of said commission, or the
appointing power specifies sex.''22 The other contention was
answered by the statement that there was no statutory justification for using temporary employees to hold jobs for those in
military service but that, to the contrary, both the statute and
the rules of the commission made special provision for the reemployment of returning veterans.
A part of the opinion is so emphatic that it will well bear
repetition. Among other things the court said:
The statute necessarily took from the department heads the
arbitrary power to make appointments; under the statute
they must fill the positions under their jurisdiction with
personnel certified to them by the civil service commission.
We think these fundamental concepts of civil service, as expressed by the legislature, furnish ample reason for disapproval of the course employed in this proceeding. To hold
21 People ex rel. Arden v. Gallagher, 160 App. Div. 27, 144 N. Y. S. 900 (1913).
22 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Cb. 24/2, § 12.
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that the appointing officer has the right to make temporary
appointments when there is none of the sex he designates on
an eligible list, would throw open the door to abuse and circumvention of the Civil Service Act, the fundamental purpose
of which is to improve public service. The foundation principle of the Act is that appointments to municipal offices or
employments must be made according to merit and fitness to
28
be ascertained by competitive examinations.
If that attitude is maintained, deliberate abuse and disregard of
civil service laws is not likely to go unchecked hereafter.
Dealing as it does with the problem of veteran preference in
civil service, the case of People ex rel. Brady v. Gregory2 is particularly timely. In that decision, the Appellate Court held that
the amendment of 1943 to Section 102 of the Cities Civil Service
Act, 25 extending credit for military service in civil service promotional examinations to include such service rendered in World
War II, does not apply to candidates who have taken promotional
examinations and whose names appear on posted eligible lists
issued prior to the enactment of the amendment. The opinion
covered twelve consolidated and substantially identical mandamus
cases each seeking promotional credit on earlier lists for military
service performed after posting. Motions to strike the several
complaints were overruled in the trial court and, when the defendants elected to stand on their motions, the requested writs
were awarded. At the time of reversing, the Appellate Court
cited with approval from O'Brien v. Frazier,26 a case dealing with
substantially the same problem in connection with veterans of
World War I. Despite an indicated desire to extend all possible
benefits to veterans, it held that the statute was clear and contemplated only two types of advantage, to-wit: (1) actual preference
330 Ill. App. 172 at 179, 71 N. E. (2d) 96 at 99.
Leave to appeal has been denied.
25 111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 241/2, § 49.
26 228 I1. App. 118 (1923).
24331 Ill. App. 259, 73 N. E. (2d) 1 (1947).
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in securing appointments to civil service positions, and (2) additional credits in examinations for promotion.
The Appellate Court decisions in People ex rel. Fosse v. Allman 28 and the much publicized case of Cartan v. Gregory29 add
nothing new to the law, but do serve as practical applications and
reaffirmations of the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in
F umkhouser v. Coffin,30 also a civil service case. In that case the
court held that, on review by certiorari, the existence of all jurisdictional facts must appear affirmatively in the record and that
there can be no indulgence in presumptions of jurisdiction so that
the record not only has to show that the board acted upon evidence but it also has to contain the testimony upon which the
decision was based, in order that the court might determine
whether there was any evidence fairly tending to sustain the
order. As that doctrine expands the actual scope of review by
common law certiorari in proportion to the expansion of the
concept of jurisdictional facts, it is worthy of note that in Illinois
such concept had become quite broad in civil service cases.3 1
MUNICIPAL CORPO IATIONS

While there were no monumental decisions in this branch of
public law during the period of this survey, some cases are worthy
of more than passing comment. For example, the case of People
ex rel. Touhy v. City of Chicago3 2 concerned the validity of what
is commonly referred to as the Municipal Slum Clearance Act38
there attacked on the ground that it permitted the taking of private property for other than a public use. As the objective of
the statute is to rehabilitate or redevelop blighted and slum areas,
27 See also People ex rel. Hansen v. Collins, 266 Ill. App. 24 (1932), affirmed in
351 Ill. 551, 184 N. E. 641 (1933), and People ex rel. McCabe v. Gregory, 328 Ill.
App. 513, 66 N. E. (2d) 451 (1946), leave to appeal denied.
2s 329 Ill. App. 296, 68 N. E. (2d) 203 (1946).
29329 Ill. App. 307, 68 N. E. (2d) 193 (1946), noted in 14 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 270.
30 301 Ill. 257, 133 N. E. 649 (1922).
3' For an interesting and enlightening commentary upon this phase of the Cartan
case, see 14 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 270.
Murphy, J., dissented without writing
32 394 Ill. 477, 68 N. E. (2d) 761 (1946).
an opinion.
33 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 24, § 23-103.1.
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it was decided that the land to be acquired would be acquired for
a public rather than a private purpose hence justified the use of
the power of eminent domain. Support for that decision was
found in Zurn v. City of Chicago34 which had upheld that portion
of the Neighborhood Redevelopment Act 35 similarly permitting
the use of eminent domain proceedings to acquire private property for use in the building of housing projects.
Zoning produced its share of- litigation. The case of 2700
Irving Park Building Corporationv. City of Chicago36 was a suit
brought to enjoin the enforcement of an amendment to a zoning
ordinance under which the land of the plaintiff was re-zoned
from an industrial use, the one for which purpose the plaintiff
had planned to utilize it, to one for apartment building use. The
court sustained the plaintiff's contention that there was no "reasonable connection between the rezoning of the plaintiff's property ... and the public health, safety, comfort, morals and general
welfare." ' 37 The significant factor in the case would seem to the
court's lack of appreciation of the general spirit behind zoning,
for it places the burden upon the municipality to show that there
is a reasonable relationship between the ordinance and the police
power whereas that burden should rest upon the party alleging
the invalidity. At least, the court failed to give credence to the
pronouncement, so often made, that the judgment of the city
council as to the reasonable relationship of the ordinance to the
general welfare is to be treated as conclusive if not shown to be
erroneous.3 8 Had the burden been placed on the plaintiff where
it rightfully belonged, there is occasion to doubt that the decision
34389 Ill. 114, 59 N. E. (2d) 18 (1945), noted in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
77. It is interesting to note that Justice Murphy dissented in that case and also
the one under discussion.
35 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 550.1 et seq.
36395 Ill. 138, 69 N. E. (2d) 827 (1946), noted in 14 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 718.
37 395 Ill. 138 at 151, 69 N. E. (2d) 827 at 833.
38 As a matter of fact, within the same period, the court itself said: "A zoning
ordinance is presumed to be valid. The burden is upon the one assailing such an
ordinance to overcome this presumption." See DeBartolo v. Village of Oak Park,
396 Ill. 404 at 410, 71 N. E. (2d) 693 at 696 (1947), cert. den. - U. S. -, 68 S. Ct.
72, 92 L. Ed. (adv.) 20 (1947). In that case, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the city
from enforcing a zoning ordinance which classified her property as a single residence use whereas she sought to utilize it as a multiple family residence.
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would have been the same so it can only be pointed out that, as
long as courts persist in" second-guessing"I the zoning authorities,
zoning in this state rests on an unsafe basis. The other zoning
case, that of Winnebago County v. Harrington,39 involved a nonconforming use. The defendants there had maintained an automobile repair shop on land which was subsequently zoned for
agricultural purposes, part of the work being done in the open air.
An attempt to construct a building over that portion of the land
being utilized for outdoor repair work met with opposition but
the court held that as the building would not be offensive to the
community and would serve to conceal the repair work being
done, thereby making it less objectionable, it was proper to deny
an injunction against the prop6sed construction.
Two cases required interpretation of words used in municipal
law. In the first, that of City of Elmhurst v. Buettgen,40 the
defendant was convicted of violating an ordinance prohibiting a
person from pushing, propelling, or backing any vehicle over any
sidewalk, curb or grading. He appealed on the ground that the
ordinance was unconstitutional, claiming that to deny him the
right to drive over the "sidewalk" would, in effect, deprive a
landowner of the right of ingress and egress to his property. He
argued that, if he could not propel a vehicle over a sidewalk, he
could not enter his own property by way of a driveway which
happened to intersect with a sidewalk. The court sustained the
validity of the ordinance, however, holding that it did not prohibit
access to property, hence was a reasonable and proper regulation.
To achieve that result it became necessary to define the word
"sidewalk."
The court did so by saying: "While the private
driveway of an owner of property abutting upon a street may be
considered in a sense as part of the sidewalk, it would be absurd
to presume that the term 'sidewalk' was used with such meaning
in the ordinance in question. The word 'sidewalk' taken in its
ordinary and general acceptation with regard to its general and
'4 1
popular use, does not include driveways."
39 329 Ill. App. 344, 68 N. E. (2d) 619 (1946).
40
41

394 Ill. 248, 68 N. E. (2d) 278 (1946).
394 Il1. 248 at 253, 68 N. E. (2d) 278 at 282.
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In the other case, that of Wolbach v. Village of Flossmoor,4 2
it became essential to define the word "contiguous" as it appears
in the statute allowing disconnection of property from municipal
limits. 4 8 One requirement of that statute is that the property to
be disconnected shall not, in whole or in part, be contiguous to
that of any other municipality. The southwest corner of the land
in question touched the northeast corner of an adjacent village so
the meaning of the word "contiguous" became important. The
court followed an analogy to be found in the decision in Wild v.
People ex rel. Stephens44 where it was held that parcels which
touch at one corner are not contiguous within the meaning of a
statute permitting the incorporation of contiguous property within
municipal limits. The test of contiguity, therefore, seems to require that a person must be able to pass from one plot of land
to the other without being obliged to step over a third.
Municipal tort liability was involved in Scarpaci v. City of
Chicago45 where the minor plaintiff claimed to have been injured
when a metal stop sign, erected and maintained by the defendant,
fell on him. Plaintiff's theory was that the injury resulted from
a failure on the part of the municipal defendant to maintain its
streets in a reasonably safe condition. The city defended on the
ground that as traffic control is a governmental function it was
immune from liability for any injury arising therefrom. While
the court agreed with the premise of the defendant's argument it
came to the conclusion that the breach of the obligation to keep
its thoroughfares in a reasonably safe condition was the prime
factor in causing the injury even though that breach grew out of
the exercise of a governmental function, hence no immunity
46
existed.
Ill. App. 528, 69 N. E. (2d) 704 (1946). Leave to appeal has been denied
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 24, § 7-42.
44 227 Ill. 556, 81 N. E. 707 (1907).
45 329 Ill. App. 434, 69 N, E. (2d) 100 (1946). Brief mention might also be made
of the decision in Hendriksen v. City of Chicago, 330 Ill. App. 141, 70 N. E. (2d)
848 (1947), wherein it was held that a municipal employee, serving as a fireman on
a municipally owned tugboat, was entitled to the benefits of the Jones Act, 46 U.
S. C. A. § 688, rather than the state workmen's compensation laws, for injuries
arising out of his employment.
46 Many small additions and amendments have been made to the Cities and
Villages Act, but they are of limited interest so no comment is made thereon. Forfurther particulars, see Laws 1947, pp. 380-638.
42 3-29
43
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PUBLIC UTILITrES

The Public Utilities Act directs the Illinois Commerce Commission to require all utilities under its jurisdiction to comply
not only with that act but also with any other applicable law.47
It was argued, in Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Commerce
Commission,4s that as there is a statutory provision which requires
railroads to build and maintain depots for the comfort of passengers and for the protection of shippers of freight in all towns on
their lines having populations of two hundred or more, 49 the commission was right in denying a petition by the railroad company
for permission to change an agency station into a non-agency
station in charge of a caretaker in a given town. The Supreme
Court nevertheless affirmed an order by the circuit court, setting
aside the order of the commission, by saying that the requirement
to maintain a depot did not necessarily involve the maintenance
of an agent to operate it and that the depot would actually be
"maintained" even though in charge of a caretaker.
In that same case, it was also held that there is no requirement that a railroad company as a whole must be operated at a
loss before public convenience and necessity will authorize the
closing of an agency station which is being operated at a loss. On
this point, the court said:
WVhen the statute refers to public convenience and necessity
it does not mean the one or more persons that may be benefited at a particular locality, but it means the public generally,
and, in determining the true public convenience, the effect of
the order upon the whole public instead of a small part of
the public should be taken into consideration.5 0
Much the same principle was involved in Illinois Central Railroad
Company v. Commerce Commission51 where the denial by the comIil. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 111%, § 8.
Ill. 387, 74 N. E. (2d) 526 (1947).
49 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 114, § 48.
50 397 I1. 387 at 395, 74 N. E.- (2d) 526 at 530. See also a case bearing identical
names and similar facts in 397 I. 323, 74 N. E. (2d) 545 (1947).
51395 Ill. 303, 70 N. E. (2d) 64 (1946). Thompson, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
47

48 397
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mission of a petition to abandon a bridge over the railroad was
set aside by the court when it found that the continued maintenance of the bridge would be "practically for the sole convenience
52
of the experiment farm operated by the University of Illinois."
This, the court concluded was not the public convenience and
necessity required to support an order of the commission.
The Commission fared no better before the court in the case
of South Suburban Safeway Lines, Inc. v. Gold Star Lines. 53
There, in sum, Gold Star Lines, a public motor bus company, had
transferred and assigned certificates of convenience and necessity
to Suburban under the terms of contracts approved by the commission. Both the contracts and the commission's orders approving the assignments recited that Gold Star should no longer
transport local traffic over the routes in question although it might
operate over those routes in connection with its longer hauls.
Suburban, claiming that Gold Star had transported local traffic in
violation of its contract and of the orders of the commission, filed
a complaint before the commission which body, after hearing,
ordered Gold Star to cease and desist from such operations. In
declaring the order of the commission to be a nullity and setting
it aside, the court pointed out that there was nothing in the complaint that indicated "a purpose of having the Commission make
Gold Star furnish a more efficient public service. It was limited
to the protection of Suburban's rights under the certificate against
the alleged transgressions of Gold Star. ' 54 Under such circumstances, said the court, the power of the commission was limited
by Section 75 of the Public Utilities Act 55 to the institution of
legal proceedings in court "for the purpose of having such violation . .. stopped . . .either by mandamus or injunction."56 Any
belief that the decision in Public Utilities Commission v. Okaw
Valley Mutual Telephone Association57 indicated a greater power
in the commission was explicitly dispelled.
II. 303 at 314, 70 N. E. (2d) 64 at 69.
53 397 Ill.
155, 73 N. E. (2d) 407 (1947).
54397 Ill.
155 at 163, 73 N. E. (2d) 407 at 410.
§ 79.
55 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1112,
155 at 162, 73 N. E. (2d) 407 at 410.
56 397 Ill.
57 282 I1. 336, 118 N. E. 760 (1918).
52 395
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TAXATION

The Supreme Court reports for the period of this survey contain the usual cases dealing with objections to tax rates, but they
appear to involve merely the application of familiar and wellsettled principles to newly arising levies and only serve to impose
upon that court the responsibility for finally deciding such questions as whether or not a particular levy is sufficiently specific and
itemized, whether a levy for a particular purpose is lawful, or
whether or not the tax officials have followed the statutory procedure with sufficient nicety.58
The case of People v. Phillips, 9 deemed worthy of mention,
involved an attempt to assess separately certain land and a royalty interest therein under an oil and gas lease under the designation of a "mineral deed." The tax upon the land itself was
paid and objection was made to the application of the county collector for judgment for the "mineral deed" tax. In sustaining
the objectors, the Supreme Court held that while a mineral deed
conveys title to the minerals under Section 7 of the Mining Act6"
and renders the separate mineral estate taxable, an oil and gas
lease merely reserves a rental which follows the land. The court
further held that such an objector need not, as a condition to
filing an objection, pay three-fourths of the tax in accordance with
Section 194 of the Revenue Act inasmuch as he comes within the
exception there created, i.e., when objection is filed "for any rea' 61
son other than the real estate is not subject to taxation."
The case of People v. City of Quincy 62 required an interpretation of Section 19 of the 1939 Revenue Act6 3 as it posed the specific
question of whether a municipal airport located outside of the
58 See, for example, People v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 397 Ill. 266, 73 N. E. (2d) 418
(1947) ; People v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 397 Ill. 50, 72 N. E, (2d) 821 (1947) ; People
v. Frankenstein & Co., 396 Ill. 524, 72 N. E. (2d) 340 (1947) ; People v. Riche, 396
Ill. 85, 71 N. E. (2d) 333 (1947) ;People v. Wabash R. R. Co., 395 Ill. 520, 70 N. E.
(2d) 718 (1947) ; People v. Wabash R. R. Co., 395 Ill. 243, 70 N. E. (2d) 36 (1946).
59394 Ill. 119, 67 N. E. (2d) 281 (1946), noted in 36 111. B. J. 93.
60 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 94, § 7.
61 Ibid., Ch. 120, § 675.
62 395 Ill. 190, 69 N. E. (2d) 892 (1946).
63 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 120, § 500.
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municipal limits was exempt thereunder from proper taxation.
The facts were stipulated and showed the acquisition by condemnation of a substantial area of land, located approximately ten
miles from the city, for use as an airport. The land was paid for
by the sale of validly issued municipal bonds and, at the time of
the hearing, runways and buildings were being constructed on the
property under the sponsorship and direction of, and with funds
provided through, the Civil Aeronautics Administration pursuant
to a contract obligating the city to operate the land as an airport
for the sole use and benefit of the public. Exemption under the
statute could have been asserted either through clause 6, relating
to property owned by any city or village outside of the corporate
limits "if used exclusively for municipal purposes," or through
clause 9, concerning market houses, public squares and other
public grounds owned by a municipal corporation and "used excluApparently the parties ignored
sively for public purposes."
clause 9 and confined themselves to a consideration of whether or
not the airport could be brought within the first of these provisions. The opinion of the court, delivered by Justice Smith, took
the position that clause 9 was applicable, was decisive of the case,
and that the airport was exempt from taxation. Chief Justice
Gunn and Justice Murphy, however, concurred specially upon the
ground that the property was exempt under clause 6 and that
clause 9 was inapplicable.
Examination of the statutory provisions referred to immediately suggests two difficulties in this construction, to-wit: (1)
that since clause 6 provides specifically for property outside the
corporate limits, the more general language of clause 9 must not
have been intended to be applicable thereto, and (2) the doctrine
of noscitur associis, which would require that the "other public
grounds" mentioned must be limited to property similar to "market houses" and "public squares." The court met the first problem rather obliquely by tracing the history of the statute, showing
that clause 6 was added by amendment, and inferring therefrom
that it was not intended to diminish the scope of the other clause.
After a review of authorities, the court concluded as follows:
From the foregoing cases the following rules may be deduced
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as to what constitutes a use for public purposes, within the
meaning of paragraph (9) of section 19 of the Revenue Act
of 1939; First, if the property is located within the limits of
the municipal corporation, and is devoted to the use of the
public as represented by the residents of that area, it is being
used for public purposes; Second, if the property is located
outside the limits of the municipal corporation, it can only
be considered as being used for public purposes when it is
open on equal terms to use by the public generally, rather
than being limited in its use to the inhabitants of the munici6 4
pal corporation which owns the property.
The justices who concurred specially rejected the application of
clause 9 under the doctrine of noscitur associis, relying upon In
the Matter of Swigart6 5 and Roodhouse Water Corporation v.
Board of Review. 6 They were of the opinion that the property
would be used exclusively for "municipal" as well as "public"
purposes so therefore concluded that clause 6 was controlling.
Attorneys who are working with tax rates will find Anderson
v. City of Park Ridge6 7 of interest, involving as it does an interpretation by the Supreme Court of section 162a, added in 1945 to
the 1939 Revenue Act,6 as well as certain problems of more general interest. The court had before it an injunction suit by a
single taxpayer to enjoin the extension of an illegal tax, together
with a request for a declaratory judgment as to the construction
and application of the statutory provision in question. The Taxpayers' Federation of Illinois obtained leave to intervene as a
party plaintiff before decree. The court held, despite the urgent
insistence of the State's Attorney to the contrary, that a court of
equity could assume jurisdiction of a suit by a single taxpayer
to enjoin the extension or collection of an entire tax levy. The
64395 Ill. 190 at 200, 69 N. E. (2d) 892 at 897.

65 123 Ill. 267, 14 N. E. 32 (1887).
66 303 Ill. 465, 135 N. E. 708 (1922).
67 396 Ill. 235, 72 N. E. (2d) 210 (1947), noted in 36 I1. B. J. 11.
68 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 120, § 643a.
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court relied on Knopf v. First National Bank6" and Green v.
70
Mail.
With respect to the request for a declaratory judgment concerning the statutory provisions, the court indicated that such a
judgment would be applicable to taxing districts not here involved,
although neither such taxing districts nor taxpayers not before
the court would be bound by any declaratory judgment which
might be entered. The court indicated that granting declaratory
judgment in this proceeding would accomplish nothing, for all of
the relief which taxpayer claimed could be allowed to her in the
injunction proceedings, and such a judgment would have no
greater force or effect by virtue of the doctrine of res judicata
than would the decision of the court by virtue of the doctrine of
stare decisis.
In Weil-McLain Company v. Collins,7 1 the Illinois Supreme
Court approved the constitutionality of the 1945 amendment to
Section 6 of the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act 72 and also indicated the application thereof. The effect of the amendment was
to require all claims for refund to be made to the Department of
Finance and to deprive the courts of jurisdiction of any such
claims except by way of review of proceedings had before the
department. Formerly, of course, it had been the practice to file
claims for refund as an adjunct to an equity suit to restrain the
imposition of the tax. In the instant case, prior to the adoption
of the amendment, certain plaintiffs had filed suit to enjoin collection of the tax. A decree was entered therein in August, 1944,
finding that the original plaintiffs were in the business of selling
plumbing and heating supplies and building material to contractors and subcontractors; that as such they were not liable to
pay a tax; and that they were entitled to refunds under Section 6
of the statute as it then stood. On July 18, 1945, a similar supplemental decree was entered upon behalf of certain intervenors
followed, on November 14th and November 23rd, by similar decrees
69 173 Il1. 331, 50 N. E. 660 (1898).
70362 Ill. 518, 200 N. E. 604 (1936).
Herrick, J., dissented.
71 395 Ill. 503, 71 N. E. (2d) 91 (1947).
72 Il.
Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 120, § 445.
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entered in favor of additional intervening plaintiffs. The effective
date of the amendment to the statute was July 25, 1945. The court
held that the amendment was in all respects valid hence was effective against all persons who intervened in the proceeding after
its effective date. It rejected the contention that these intervenors
were entitled to enjoy the same rights as those who were parties
73
to the original decree.
TRADE REGULATION

The Illinois legislature, by an act filed July 29, 1947, 74 has
made fair trade contracts, heretofore permissible7" under the
Fair Trade Act, 76 into compulsory ones for manufacturers, distributors and importing distributors, at least in connection with
their sales through Illinois retailers, of all alcoholic liquor except
beer. All such contracts must be filed with the Illinois Liquor
Control Commission and that body's consent must be obtained for
so-called "close-out" sales or sales at less than the minimum price
stipulated in the contracts. While no provision is made for damages resulting from a violation of the contract, 77 the commission
is given power to suspend or revoke retail licenses for sales in
violation thereof. 7I The act marks an interesting development in
.governmental regulation. At one time, under the Sherman Act,
resale price maintenance contracts were forbidden. Later, under
the Miller-Tydings amendment to the Sherman Act, such contracts
were permitted but not compelled. The present statute, which
probably is permissible under the Miller-Tydings amendment, thus
marks a complete reversal in governmental attitude.
The Appellate Court, through the decision in Good House73 Attention is invited to the fact that the original proceeding was not a class
suit, as has heretofore been the practice in connection with occupational tax litigation in Illinois.
74 Laws 1947, p. 17, H. B. 755; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 43, §§ 196-204.
75 See Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183,
57 S. Ct. 139, 81 L. Ed. 109 (1936).
76 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y, § 188 et seq.
77 Section 2 of the Fair Trade Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y2, § 189, gives a
right of action to any person damaged by sales made or advertised in violation of
price maintenance contracts.
78 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 43, § 203.
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keeping Shops, Inc. v. Kaye7 11 has given nourishment to the still
young but accepted "Lady Esther doctrine," which holds that a
plaintiff may have relief from a defendant who causes confusion
in the minds of purchasers as to whether or not certain products
are those of the plaintiff even though there is no actual "palming
off" of defendant's goods for those of the plaintiff and despite
the absence of competition between plaintiff and defendant. Although the court therein denied relief to the plaintiff it was not
because of any quarrel with the doctrine but simply because there
was no evidence that customers or prospective customers of plaintiff, or the general public, were confused or deceived by the trade
names used by defendant.
A real blow, however, was struck at the doctrine by the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the case of General
0
Industries Company v. 20 Wacker Drive Building Corporation"
where it denied the right of the plaintiff, an Ohio corporation, to
enjoin the defendant from forming an Illinois corporation having
the same name. The lower court had found that a "likelihood of
confusion would arise from the defendant's use of a name practically identical with that of the plaintiff and that the nearly exact
identity of the two names would be very confusing to any person
dealing in the stock of either corporation and in identifying products produced or to be produced by the two companies.""' It had,
accordingly, granted relief to the plaintiff even though there was
no showing of an intention to compete. The higher court reversed
and distinguished the Lady Esther case by saying that a secondary
meaning had been shown to have been acquired in that case while
none was proven in the instant case. For that reason, it said:
It is not the use of similar names that might lead to confusion,
it is the abuse of such similar names injurious to the plaintiff
that may be enjoined. Mere confusion of the public in the
79 330 Ill. App. 376, 71 N. E. (2d) 176 (1947).
See also Lady Esther, Ltd. v. Lady
Esther Corset Shoppe, Inc., 317 Ill. App. 451, 46 N. E. (2d) 165 (1943), noted in 22
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 74.
80 156 F. (2d) 474 (1946). Lindley, J., dissented in part. Certiorari has been
'denied: 329 U. S. 833, 67 S. Ct. 370, 91 L. Ed. (adv.) 241 (1946).
81 156 F. (2d) 474 at 475.
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use of similar names that are publici juris cannot be enjoined
8 2
by the plaintiff or by any other private individual.
There was, in fact, no finding in the Lady Esther case that the
name of the plaintiff had acquired a secondary meaning. The
decision rested solely on the existence of confusion. To impinge
the secondary meaning rule on what was a clearly enunciated doctrine and in the face of a finding of confusion such as that on
which the Lady Esther case was based, not only adds unnecessary,
perplexing and detracting appendage to that doctrine but, since
it was added by a federal court, is of questionable legality.8 3 A
dissenting opinion was filed in the instant case, and it has been
84
justly criticized.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Perhaps no case excited more public attention than the decision in People ex rel. McColum v. Board of Education of School
District No. 7185 wherein mandamus was denied to a parent who
sought to prevent the use of school premises and the expenditure
of public funds in the maintenance of classes of religious instruction during regular school hours. The practice of granting "released time" on parental request to permit attendance on religious
instruction elsewhere had been upheld in People ex rel. Latimer v.
Board of Education of City of Chicago,80 despite the objection
therein that to do so violated the constitutional provisions respecting freedom of religion. It was there held that as no discrimination was practiced, no particular denomination was favored, and
no utilization was made of school facilities, the question boiled
down to the simple proposition of the sufficiency of the excuse
being granted for absence from school. On that score, it was said
that. any reasonable regulation of the school authorities on the
subject was a matter of no concern to the relator for it violated
no aspect of the compulsory attendance law.
82 156 F. (2d)

474 at 477.

83 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938).

84 See note thereon in 41 Iin. L. Rev. 679.
85396 I1. 14, 71 N. E. (2d) 161 (1947), noted in 35 111. B. J. 361.
s6394 I1. 228, 68 N. E. (2d) 305 (1946), noted in 22 Notre Dame Lawyer 360.
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The instant decision, however, carried the point still farther
for the practice therein disclosed had reached the point where the
classes were conducted on the school premises, during regular
classroom hours, by teachers not on the regular staff but subject
to the supervision of the school superintendent, and involved the
service of regular teachers in circularizing the parents of pupils
in order to gain the desired consents. The court, however, concluded that as there was no direct compulsion on any student to
attend, no violation of Section 3 of Article II of the state constitution had occurred, and the incidental use made of the school premises did not amount to an "appropriation or pay" from any public
fund in aid of any church or sectarian purpose such as is forbidden by Section 3 of Article VIII.
It is true that no direct cash contribution was made by the
school authorities to the plan for providing religious instruction
but the fact remained that if permission had not been granted for
the use of the school premises the council in charge of the plan
would have been forced to pay for comparable facilities elsewhere.
To shrug off that fact by use of the maxim de minimus non curat
lex hardly comports with the statement of Justice Rutledge that
the "realm of religious training and belief remains . . . the kingdom of the individual man and his God. It should be kept inviolably private." 7 As the case is now before the United States
Supreme Court there will be opportunity for that body to fix a
boundary line on proper state action in a field where feeling may
often override judgment. 8
While the clash between public and private rights may be
most dramatic when it occurs in the realm of the personal freedoms, it may be of far deeper significance if less noticeable when
it develops in the field of property. For that reason, the decision
87 See dissent to Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, 330 U. S. 1
at 57-8, 67 S. Ct. 504 at 532, 91 L. Ed. (adv.) 472 at 501 (1947), affirming 133
N. J. L. 350, 44 A. (2d) 333 (1945). That case involved the right of school authorities to reimburse parents for money expended in paying bus transportation to public
and also to parochial schools.
8s It is understood that the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court was reversed,
not in the period of this survey, when the United States Supreme Court took jurisdiction of an appeal therefrom: - U. S. -, 68 S. Ct. 461, 92 L. Ed. (adv.) 451
(1948).
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in Northern Illinois Coal Corporation v. Medill"9 should not
escape attention. Challenge was directed therein to the constitutionality of the "open cut" or "strip" mining statute adopted in
1943 whereby it was designed to compel mining operators to
restore the general contour of the land after mining operations
so as to remove the general unsightliness of the spoil ridges created thereby.9 0 Effort was made therein to sustain the measure on
the ground that it presented a reasonable regulation of private
property rights in the interest of public health; would eliminate
the possibility of the collection of pools of stagnant water in
which noxious insects could breed; would prevent depreciation in
the value of adjoining property; and would be a suitable conservation measure, since strip mining,, as now practiced, forever destroys the highest and best use to which the land could be put.
The entire plan collapsed when both the trial and the Supreme
courts declared the statute unconstitutional as a capricious, unreasonable and arbitrary interference with private rights of
ownership; capricious because not truly designed to promote
public health, unreasonable because limited in application to coal
miners and not binding on those who remove other mineral products in a similar fashion, but above all arbitrary because it forced
the land owner to restore the soil to a condition suitable to cultivation whereas he might desire to utilize it for reforestation or
devote it to grazing. 9 1
It is equally important under a dual system of government
such as is ours to avoid, wherever possible, any clash between
state and federal regulation of business. Conflict may arise, however, for state regulation often proceeds federal control and, upon
initiation of the latter, produces a problem as to whether or not
the federal regulation does occupy the entire field to the disruption
of state plans. Evidence of that difficulty may be observed in
89 397 Ill. 98, 72 N. E. (2d) 844 (1947).
90 Laws 1943, Vol. 1, p. 912; I1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 93, § 162 et seq.

91 The court distinguished the case of Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190,
20 S. Ct. 576, 44 L. Ed. 729 (1900), from the one before it on the ground that the
conservation measure there involved was designed to prevent waste which would
injure adjoining owners as well. The presence of spoil ridges, the court noted,
would not prevent an adjoining owner from enjoying his property to the fullest
extent.
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two important decisions of the United States Supreme Court bearing on local law. In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corporation2 the
area of conflict developed between state regulation of a public
grain elevator under the Illinois Public Utilities Act 3 and federal
licensing under the United States Warehouse Act.9 4 The litigation was brought about when a local dealer in grain caused proceedings to be instituted before the state commission charging
unjust rates, discriminatory practices, failure to provide safe and
adequate facilities, operation without state license, and illegal
issuance of securities on the part of the elevator corporation. The
elevator operator brought suit to enjoin the commission from
making an investigation or in any way acting upon the complaint
on the ground, that Congress, by the 1931 amendment to the federal statute, had indicated a purpose to put complete control of
federally licensed warehouses under the sole jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Agriculture. The majority of the United States
Supreme Court agreed with the elevator proprietor's contention
as to all issues except those dealing with the issuance of securities
or other financial questions. That ruling was said to be justified,
even though there was no declaration of congressional purpose on
the point, from the mere fact that, by the 1931 amendment, Congress had repealed the provision permitting the continued operation of state law and had substituted in its stead one giving exclusive jurisdiction over federal licensees to the Secretary of Agriculture in all matters except those relating to financial structure.9 5
The other case, that of Rice v. Board of Trade,9" dealt with a
similar alleged conflict between the Illinois Public Utilities Act 9 7
and the federal Commodity Exchange Act,9 8 but it was the judg92331 U. S. 218, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 91 L. Ed. (adv.) 1043 (1947), noted in 56 Yale
L. J. 1265. Frankfurter, J., wrote a dissenting opinion concurred in by Rutledge, J.
93 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 114, § 189 et seq.
94 7 U. S. C. A. § 241 et seq.
95 The dissenting justice pointed out that he could find no such intention because
there was no substantial increase in appropriation such as would be necessary to
provide for the additional labor which would be entailed if federal regulation was
to be the sole one and that, in the ensuing years, federal administrative practices
had not been changed in the slightest.
96 331 U. S. 247, 67 S. Ct. 1160, 91 L. Ed. (adv.) 1058 (1947).
97 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 114, § 194b.
9s 7 U. S. C. A. § 1 et seq.
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ment of the court that, in the absence of a provision such as existed
in the preceding case, there was no evidence of any intention to
have federal law supersede state regulation hence it was proper
for the state commission to investigate a complaint that the board
of trade was seeking to enforce rules which had not been filed with
or approved by the state commission.
A somewhat related conflict between the state and federal
governments is revealed in People ex rel. WoUt v. Graber9 9 wherein
the Illinois Supreme Court, on an original petition for mandamus,
ordered the trial judge to expunge an order by which he had forbade the United States District Attorney from acting as the attorney for an individual defendant in a case pending before him.
That order had been based on the idea that as no right of the
United States government was involved in the proceeding it was
improper for the federal official to act in behalf of a private litigant even though that person happened to be a federal employee.
It was held that it was not the province of the trial judge but that
of the federal Attorney General to determine whether federal
interests were at stake1 and, consequently, a determination by that
official to appear was not subject to control by a state court judge.
No person would dispute the right of the legislature to enact
legislation providing preferential treatment for honorably discharged veterans in such matters as appointment to or promotion
in civil service, 2 but the Supreme Court held, in People ex rel.
Jendrick v. Allman, 3 that the legislature had carried the "special
privilege" idea beyond all reasonable constitutional limits when
it enacted the 1945 amendment to Section 12 of the Civil Service
Act. 4 The petitioner therein sought to conmpel his reinstatement to
the position of patrolman from which he had been discharged by
reason of his deliberate understatement of his age. He relied on
the fact that the legislature had, through the amendment, removed
such conduct as a ground for discharge at least as to all honorably
99 394 Ill. 362, 68 N. E. (2d) 750 (1946).
1 5 U. S. C. A. § 316.
2 See People ex rel. Sellers v. Brady, 262 Ill. 578, 105 N. E. 1 (1914).
3 396 Il. 35, 71 N. E. (2d) 44 (1947).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 24 , § 51.
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discharged veterans. The trial court considered the statute unconstitutional and the Supreme Court affirmed when it found a
direct violation of Section 22 of Article IV of the state constitution prohibiting the passage of special legislation. The "reasonableness" of the classification justifying a different treatment for
honorably discharged veterans in some civil service matters was
said to be lacking in a statute which tended to put a premium on
fraud. Of more significance to veterans of World War II, but
not involving any particularly new legal points, was the Supreme
Court's approval of the Bonus Act authorizing the pledging of the
state's credit for the purpose of paying compensation to resident
veterans of that war.5
CONFLICT OF LAWS

Mention was made last year of the decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court in the case of People ex rel. Jones v. Chicago
Lloyds6 wherein it was held that it was not necessary under the
full faith and credit clause for a state court to recognize a default
judgment rendered in a sister state subsequent to a decree transferring the property of the judgment debtor to a trustee, even
though jurisdiction had been acquired over the judgment debtor
in the foreign action prior to the appointment of a statutory
liquidator. Upon certiorari granted, a majority of the justices of
the United States Supreme Court voted for reversal. 7 They were
of the opinion that the foreign judgment was valid and final; that
it was not necessary to have control over proof of claims in order
to have exclusive jurisdiction of the assets, since the judgment in
no way affected the title thereto; that principles applicable to
federal bankruptcy proceedings were inapplicable in state liquidation matters; that the foreign court was not bound to respect the
local liquidation proceedings unless the existence thereof was
5 See Routt v. Barrett, 396 Ill. 322, 71 N. E. (2d) 660 (1947). The constitutional
issues not already settled by the decision in Hagler v. Small, 307 Ill. 460, 138 N. E.
849 (1923), which dealt with a similar bonus measure after World War I, principally turned on the sufficiency of the ballot under which the proposition was submitted to the electorate.
6 391 Il. 492, 63 N. E. (2d) 479 (1945), noted in 25 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW
71-2, 46 Col. L. Rev. 479.
7 329 U. S. 545, 67 S. Ct. 451, 91 L. Ed. (adv.) 399 (1947). Frankfurter, J., wrote
a dissenting opinion concurred in by Justices Black and Rutledge.
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called to its attention by way of defense; and that any argument
of convenience was outweighed by an equal argument in favor of
the foreign creditor and his court which had first acquired jurisdiction over the claim and the parties. The dissenters, on the
other hand, believed that it was unfair to allow the foreign creditor to share in the distribution of a common fund not on the basis
of a claim established according to a uniform procedure but solely
on the basis that he had, in his own state, procured a judgment.
Much as that judgment might be binding as to assets located
there, it was thought improper to allow it to be asserted against
assets accumulated in Illinois under a statute clearly giving notice
that, upon insolvency, the property there located was to be made
available to claimants only on a prescribed basis.

